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This article considers the tension between free speech rights and 
private property/contract rights. Neither free speech rights nor private 
property and contract rights are absolute. Where they intersect in the 
physical world, confusing legal doctrines usually emerge, such as the 
U.S. Supreme Court cases addressing private speech at privately­
owned company towns and shopping centers.' Though a bright-line 
rule has emerged-the First Amendment pertains only to state 
actors-the rule provides little prospective guidance because private 
actors can be characterized as state actors in some circumstances. 
In the online world, the speech/rights dichotomy also raises 
complex issues. Online private actors routinely use their private 
property (such as computers and networks) to create virtual spaces 
designed for speech, though speaker access is usually controlled by 
contract. An online provider exercising its property or contract rights 
inevitably squelches a speaker's rights. Nevertheless, despite online 
providers' capacity to exercise their rights capriciously, courts so far 
have unanimously held that private online providers are not state 
actors for First Amendment purposes.2 
t Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Email: 
eric.goldman@marquette.edu. Web page: http://ww.ericgoldman.org. I presented a version of 
this Essay at the Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal's Rules & Borders­
Regulating Digital Environments Symposium held February 11, 2005. 
I. See, e.g., Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. Nat'l 
Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 
(1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.s. 501 (1946). 
2. See, e.g., Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc. 119 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Nat'l A-I 
Adver. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. N.H. 2000); CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Am. Online, Inc. v. Cyber 
Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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With the emergence of virtual worlds, we must once again 
consider the speech/rights balance. To strike the balance, we must 
decide if virtual worlds are more like physical world company towns 
or shopping centers or just another category of online providers. 
Some commentators, most prominently Professor Jack Balkin of Yale 
Law School, believe that virtual worlds are different and have argued 
for limits to a virtual world provider's ability to regulate speech by its 
participants? This article rejects these arguments, using a recent 
incident involving Sims Online and Peter Ludlow, to show that virtual 
worlds are not distinguishable from other online providers. As a 
result, this article concludes that we should not create special speech 
rules for virtual worlds. 
I. PETER LUDLOW AND SIMS ONLINE 
Sims Online is a for-profit subscription-based massively 
mUltiplayer online role-playing game ("MMORPG") operated by 
Electronic Arts ("EA,,).4 Peter Ludlow is a University of Michigan 
philosophy professorS and author of the Alphavile Herald virtual 
newspaper,6 which chronicled in-game developments. 
The incident started when Ludlow alleged that Sims Online 
participants, including some teenagers, engaged in "cyber­
prostitution" in the game.7 The term "cyber-prostitution" implied that 
avatars were engaging in simulated sex, but the game's architecture 
limited the participants' ability to do SO.8 Instead, participants 
(including some teenagers) allegedly traded cybersex chat for in-game 
currency,9 though Ludlow picked a fairly inflammatory term to make 
the point. 
3. See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in 
Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REv. 2043 (2004). 
4. The game's web page is located at 
http://www.eagames.comlofficiallthesims/thesimsonline/us/nailindex.jsp (last visited April 3, 
2005). See generally F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 
CAL. L. REv. I (2004) (discussing Sims Online extensively). 
5. Peter Ludlow's university website is located at 
http://www-personal.umich.edul-Iudlow/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2005). 
6. The newspaper, really a blog, is located at http://ww.alphavilleherald.coml (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2005). It has been renamed the Second Life Herald. 
7. See Amy Harmon, A Real-Life Debate on Free Expression in a Cyberspace City, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at A I; Farhad Manjoo, Raking Muck in "The Sims Online," SALON, 
Dec. 12,2003, at 
http://ww.salon.comltechlfeature/2003/12/12/sims_online_newspaper/index_np.html . 
8. See Harmon, supra note 7. 
9. See Harmon, supra note 7; Manjoo, supra note 7. 
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Ludlow's claim received some media attention, and Ludlow 
claims EA targeted him because this publicity was damaging to EA. \0 
EA responded that Ludlow violated EA's rules by linking from his in­
game profile to his newspaper site. II It is a little unclear exactly why 
this link violated EA's rules. Some reports say the link broke the 
rules because the Herald site linked to information about how to cheat 
the game; 12 other reports say that a rule violation occurred because the 
Herald site was a commercial website. 13 Based on its user agreement, 
EA probably could have terminated Ludlow's account without any 
justification at all,14 but EA appears not to have taken that route. 
Whatever its reason, EA terminated Ludlow's account in Sims 
Online-giving him the online equivalent of the death penalty. IS 
Ludlow claims that this termination was unjustified and 
discriminatory because EA selectively enforced its rule against him 
and not others. 16 
Since the termination, Ludlow has railed against EA for its 
censorship. That is not unusual; many disgruntled customers have 
found a soapbox in cyberspace. What is unusual, however, is that 
Peter Ludlow's story became a cause celebre. His termination was 
covered by the New York Times,17 the Boston Globe/8 CNN,19 the 
BBC20 and Salon,21 and high-profile commentators like Professor 
Balkin have supported his cause.22 
10. See Manjoo, supra note 7. 
11. See Manjoo, supra note 7. 
12. See Harmon, supra note 7. 
13. See Manjoo, supra note 7. 
14. It is virtually impossible to determine the exact terms of the EA-Ludlow user 
agreement. However, many (maybe all?) EA user agreements contain the following language: 
"EA and you both have the right to terminate or cancel your Account or a particular subscription 
at any time." See EA Online Terms of Service, at http://www.ea.comlgioballiegalltos.jsp (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
IS. Manjoo, supra note 7. 
16. See Harmon, supra note 7; Curt Feldman, Q&A: Banned Sims Blogger Bites Back, 
GAMESPOT, Dec. 17, 2003, at http://www.gamespot.comlalllnews/news_6085767.html. 
17. See Harmon, supra note 7. 
18. See Hiawatha Bray, Justice Has Its Price in Sim World, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 
2004, available at 
http://ww.boston.comlnews/globe/livinglarticles/2004/01l14/justice_has its...price _in  sim _ wo 
rid. 
1 9. See CNN: Paula Zahn Now (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 19, 2004), available at 
2004 WL 72847478. 
20. See Mark Ward, The Dark Side of Digital Utopia, BBC NEWS, Dec. 22, 2003, at 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl l lhiitechnology/3334923.stm. 
21. See Manjoo supra note 7. 
22. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 2075-76. 
HeinOnline -- 21 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J.  848 2004-2005
848 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 8. HIGH TECH. 1.1. [Vol. 21 
II. WHEN COMPANIES FIRE THEIR CUSTOMERS 
Why should we care that a private company terminated a 
customer's account? Smart companies fire their customers all of the 
time.23 Does something make Ludlow's firing special? 
EA could have had a variety of reasons for terminating Ludlow's 
account, including their stated belief that he was violating their user 
agreement. However, for sake of argument, let us assume that this 
claim was purely pretextual to obscure that EA vindictively and 
discriminatorily censored Ludlow. Characterized this way, we 
instinctively react negatively and emotionally to the specter of 
censorship. For example, one commentator hyperbolically claimed 
that EA "acts like a classic despot, using its powers to single out 
individual critics for the dungeons and the firing squads . .. the 
Herald censorship smacks more of tyranny for its own sake.,,24 
However, when cooler heads prevail, we recognize that online 
providers routinely terminate accounts when users violate their 
private rules. In some cases, providers censor customers for reasons 
- like spam prevention-that are widely applauded.25 If other online 
providers can enforce their private rules to curtail user speech, why 
shouldn't virtual world providers be free to do so as well? 
Virtual world advocates typically advance three principal 
arguments to distinguish other online providers and explain why we 
should limit virtual world providers' discretion to terminate their 
customers. 
A. Virtual Worlds Are Immersive 
The first argument is that virtual world participants. may 
psychologically feel that they are immersed in the virtual world and, 
in some cases, spend more hours online than in the physical world.26 
23. See, e.g, DON PEPPERS ET AL., THE ONE TO ONE FIELDBOOK (1999) (discussing the 
value of firing a company's least profitable customers, called "below zero customers"); Gary 
McWilliams, Minding the Store: Analyzing Customers, Best Buy Decides Not All Are Welcome, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at Al (describing an initiative by the Best Buy retail chain to get rid 
of unprofitable customers). 
24. James Grimmelmann, Sims Online Censors Online Journalist, LAWMEME (Yale Law 
School, New Haven, Conn.), Dec. 14, 2003, at 
http://research. yale.edullawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid= 1291. 
25. See, e.g, Jim Hu, AOL Error Underscores Spam Filter Challenge, CNET NEWS.COM, 
May 22,2000, at http://news.com.coml2102-1023_3-240907.html (''Many of AOL's subscribers 
have applauded the company for installing email filters that can drastically cut down on the junk 
email that bombards their in-boxes. "). 
26. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 4, at 9. 
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However, even if some participants immerse themselves in a virtual 
world, we still need a reason to find legal significance in these self­
perceptions. People can declare themselves part of a virtual republic 
(and, in fact, do so regularly27), but this does not mean we should 
recognize these virtual republics as sovereign equivalents. So long as 
these individuals have a physical presence in the "real" world, they 
remain governed by real world laws despite their psychological 
declarations. The immersion argument is more an indictment of those 
participants' ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy than a 
reason to create new legal rules. 
B. Virtual World Commoditization 
The second argument is virtual world assets have real value.28 
An exchange rate may develop between in-game economies and 
physical world economies/9 giving some virtual assets a tangible, 
quantifiable, real-world cash value/opportunity cost. However, 
virtual worlds are not unique in this regard; cyberspace is filled with 
virtual assets that have real world value. Domain name registrars sell 
virtual locations (domain names), web publishers sell advertisers 
virtual real estate (positions on a web page), and websites even create 
an exchange rate between virtual near-currency (like airline miles or 
other loyalty program points) and cash.30 
Moreover, all of these virtual assets are built on a user 
agreement. With respect to virtual worlds, almost all user agreements 
give the provider unlimited discretion to change the world or 
terminate the participant's access in its sole discretion. Therefore, a 
participant chooses to "create" value in virtual world assets premised 
on a shaky contractual foundation. Participants still have legal 
recourse for a provider's capricious actions; contract law, consumer 
27. See Andrew Weiner, Wanted: Homeland for 300 Webheads, METROACTIVE, Nov. 22, 
2000, at http://ww.metroactive.comlpapers/cruzfl l .22.00/netnations-0047.html. 
28. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 2047. This value, in turn, may create flourishing in-game 
economies, in some cases expressly encouraged by the provider. See Noah Shachtrnan, Will 
Garners Buy What Game Sells?, WIRED NEWS, May 24, 2002, at 
http://ww.wired.comlnewslprintlO.1294.52701.00.htrnl (discussing Project Entropria, which 
encourages entrepreneurship within the game). 
29. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 4, at 10-11, 37-39. However, some providers 
(most prominently EverQuest) actively discourage these out-of-game transactions. See Greg 
Sandoval, Sony to Ban Sale of Online Characters from Its Popular Gaming Sites, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Apr. 10, 2000, at http://news.coml2101-1017_3-239052.html. 
30. See Points.com, at http://ww.points.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
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protection and other laws may still apply.3l However, absent 
deception, contract termination rights are generally upheld, even if the 
termination causes the terminated party to. lose value.32 
C. Virtual World Participants Face Switching Costs 
The third argument is that virtual world participants make 
significant investments in a world that creates costs to switch to 
alternatives.33  Some virtual world participants spend hundreds of 
hours building relationships, reputations and virtual assets, much or 
all of which is lost if the participant exits the virtual world.34 In 
theory, these switching costs could cause market failures by making it 
too costly for market participants to freely vote with their wallets and 
reward (or punish) virtual world providers appropriately. 
Despite these investments, providers still feel the effects of 
market forces for several reasons. First, participants invest at 
different levels; although heavily-invested participants get the most 
attention (and make the most noise), many paying customers are 
casual users with trivial switching costs. Second, competitors can 
offer marketing programs or product features that can induce 
participants-even the heavily-invested ones-to switch.35 Third, 
heavily-invested participants who do not terminate or switch may lose 
their enthusiasm for the world and decrease their contributions to the 
community accordingly, which can cause the world to atrophy and 
thereby make the community less compelling to newcomers.36 
Finally, word of mouth, especially about games, works really well as 
a market mechanism; if anything, the Internet (through blogs, 
enthusiast/fan sites and product review sites) has strengthened it. A 
3 L See Balkin, supra note 3 (emphasizing, in particular, the role of consumer protection 
laws). 
32. See Eric Goldman, Termination of Accounts in Virtual Worlds, TECHNOLOGY & 
MARKETING L. BLOG, Feb. 13, 2005, at 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/200S/02/termination_of.htm. In Hall v. EarthLink Network, 
Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005), an EarthLink subscriber used a personal email account for 
business purposes. EarthLink terminated the account based on a mistaken belief that Hall was a 
spammer. The Second Circuit rejected all of Hall's claims for legal redress. 
33. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 4, at 61-62; see also Balkin, supra note 3, at 
2051, 2077; Neal Stewart, Editorial: Simulating Free Speech in Virtual Lives, SECOND LIFE 
HERALD, Mar. 4, 2005, at http://ww.dragonscoveherald.comlblog/index.php?p=693. 
34. Stewart, supra note 33. 
35. Castronova has proposed some techniques that competitors can use to overcome their 
potential customers' switching costs. See Edward Castronova, Switching Costs Fall, TERRA 
NOVA, July, 24, 2004, at http://terranova.blogs.comlterra_ noval2004/07/switching_ costs.htmL 
36. See Bray, supra note 18 (discussing the disengagement of Sims Online players in 
response to EA' s perceived abdication of control). 
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bad buzz about a virtual world will keep away prospective new 
customers.37 Therefore, even if investments inhibit competitive 
switching, providers still feel the marketplace effects of their choices. 
Meanwhile, in other contexts, customers routinely incur some 
costs to switch between vendors. With respect to some online 
services (especially communication-oriented services like email, web 
hosting and blogs), these switching costs are not trivial but do not 
support regulatory intervention. Why should we give greater legal 
significance to the switching costs incurred in virtual worlds? As 
discussed above regarding commoditization, this seems especially 
problematic when the participant deliberately chose to incur these 
switching costs knowing that the provider could make unilateral 
choices at any time. 
D. Conclusion on Virtual World Diferences 
Without a doubt, virtual worlds are both academically interesting 
and emotionally compelling. They can have richly textured visual 
environments, complex and absorbing story lines, curious denizens 
and strong communities. However, we cannot let our fascination with 
virtual worlds and the people who occupy them cloud our judgment. 
Proponents of new rules for virtual worlds need to prove that virtual 
worlds should be treated differently than other online providers. This 
discussion has raised significant questions about the proffered 
justifications. 
Meanwhile, rules to protect virtual world participants from 
private censorship could have unintended consequences. Specifically, 
these rules would restrict providers' choices about how to deal with 
unwanted speech. These restrictions distort providers' abilities to 
make profit-maximizing decisions, which in turn increase providers' 
financial risk and reduce incentives to invest in the industry. 
Converting private virtual world providers into state actors could, 
paradoxically, limit speech rather than increase it. 
III. PRODIGY REDUX 
Once we acknowledge that virtual worlds are just like other 
online providers, the arguments being advanced to regulate their 
conduct begin to sound very familiar. That is because we dealt with 
online providers "censoring" their customers at least fifteen years ago. 
37. Indeed, there is some evidence that Sims Online has suffered in the marketplace for 
these very reasons. See id. 
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Specifically, the LudlowlEA incident mirrors a seminal event in 
Internet law. In the late 1980s, Prodigy Networks was a leading 
commercial online service that offered a self-contained universe of 
interactive tools, such as email, chat, message boards and file 
downloads. In 1990, Prodigy terminated the account of subscribers 
who complained about its practices, which led to claims that Prodigy 
engaged in censorship.38 Prodigy responded that it could control user­
submitted content to create a family-friendly environment, just as a 
newspaper has the right to make editorial decisions about what it 
publishes.39 
Prodigy may not have fully appreciated the consequences of its 
response. By analogizing itself to a newspaper, it implicitly invited 
courts to treat it like a newspaper in other respects as well. Five years 
later, a court did just that. In the 1995 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy 
decision, a New Y orkSupreme Court held that Prodigy was liable for 
user-submitted defamatory content on its network, just like a 
newspaper would be liable for publishing defamatory content.40 
The Stratton Oakmont decision sent shock waves through the 
nascent Internet industry. Providers seeking to offer family-friendly 
services felt that they would be liable if they failed to catch and 
remove harmful user-generated content. Other providers felt 
compelled to implement new controls over user content even if such 
efforts would inhibit the community's development or would be cost­
prohibitive. Either way, the threat of liability forced providers to 
increase their censorship of users. 
Fortunately for the Internet's development, Congress overturned 
Stratton Oakmont nine months later by enacting Section 509 of the 
Communications Decency Act,41 codified as 47 U.S. C. § 230 
("Section 230"). Section 230 grants online providers a near-blanket 
immunity from liability for their users' content.4 2  This immunity 
38. See John Markoff, Home-Computer Network Criticized for Limiting Users, N.Y. 
nMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at 01,05. The users were upset over a new surcharge Prodigy imposed 
on high-volume email users, and some irate subscribers went so far as to complain to Prodigy's 
advertisers. See Peter H. Lewis, On Electronic Bulletin Boards. What Rights Are at Stake?, 
N.Y. nMES, Dec. 23, 1990, at F8. 
39. See Geoffrey Moore, The 1st Amendment Is Safe at Prodigy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
1990, at F13. 
40. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
41. Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 509,47 U.S.C. § 230 (2005). 
42. The major exception being, of course, intellectual property claims. See 47 U.S.c. 
§ 230(e)(2). In 1998, Congress attempted to provide some protection for intellectual property 
claims via the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512, but § 512 has 
proven significantly less useful for online providers than 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
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applies whether the online provider tries to control content it deems 
objectionable or not, meaning that online providers can figure out the 
best way to serve their communities. With this legal protection, a 
thousand online communities have bloomed, spanning the spectrum 
from tightly controlled to virtually unregulated.43 This diversity has 
allowed individuals to find venues that serve their needs, giving 
customers the power to reward (or punish) providers for their choices. 
Section 230 played a non-trivial role in the Internet's ascension as a 
dominant media, a development from which we have all benefited. 
Prodigy's experiences from the early 1990s teaches a valuable 
lesson. We want to give providers the option to exercise control over 
content they deem objectionable. As a result, we give providers a 
tremendous incentive-near-absolute immunization from liability-to 
exercise this option.44 Yet, those who object to EA's private 
censorship want to strip discretion away from providers, just like 
those who complained about Prodigy fifteen years ago. Fortunately, 
we know the Prodigy story ends happily with the proliferation of 
diverse and robust online communities. Why try to rewrite this 
ending? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unquestionably, it is tempting to celebrate virtual worlds as 
emerging utopias, but such reverence only creates frustration and 
disappointment when real-life imperfections like private "censorship" 
creep in. Unfortunately, utopias do not exist, not even virtual ones,45 
and we cannot allow our romanticized visions to blind us to the real 
enemy. The enemy is not a vendor's private censorship of a 
customer, however irrational or short-sighted that may be. The real 
43. See Bray, supra note 18 (discussing Sociolotron, an adults-only game that allows 
players to engage in illicit behavior that is not permitted in Sims Online). 
44. For a general policy argument in favor of letting online providers exercise discretion 
over their community spaces, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the 
Listener's Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377. Castronova and Balkin have proposed "interration" statutes to give 
virtual world providers a safe harbor from liability if they agree to protect participant interests. 
See Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185 (2004-2005); Balkin, 
supra note 3, at 2090-97 (endorsing and extending Castronova's proposal). Of course, 47 
U.S.C. § 230 already insulates providers for participants' actions and words, although it 
excludes coverage for intellectual property claims. Therefore, the only reasons to consider 
interration is to plug the intellectual property hole in § 230 or to give new substantive rights to 
participants at providers' expense. 
45. See Ward, supra note 20 (discussing how Sims Online was touted as a virtual utopia 
but has never fulfilled that promise). 
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enemy is an emotional response to private censorship that trumps 
sound policy judgments. 
